Weapons of War: Grenades
Updated - Saturday, 26 July, 2003

As with numerous weapons significantly developed upon during World War One, the use of grenades (whose name probably dates from the French word for pomegranate) dated back some hundreds of years - to the fifteenth century in fact.

Grenade Supplies in 1914

Regarded as practical for siege operations only since Napoleonic times however, the grenade came to the attention of German army planners (notable among others) during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

As with most things at the start of the war in August 1914, the Germans were ahead of the pack in terms of grenade development.  Even as war began the Germans had 70,000 hand grenades in readiness, along with a further 106,000 rifle grenades.

Curiously, when many, perhaps most, people are asked to consider the means of trench attack most popular during the First World War, the rifle or bayonet is often suggested as the most likely answer.

Bombing Parties

In fact both of these weapons were to be used chiefly to defend the grenadiers: those men tasked with the bombing of trenches and positions using grenades of various types.  Bombing parties grew in number and frequency as the war progressed and formed a major component of any infantry attack by the war's close (although US forces used them less, chiefly on account of supply shortages).

The British bombing team usually consisted of nine men at a time: an NCO, two throwers, two carriers, two bayonet-men to defend the team and two 'spare' men for use when casualties were incurred.

As an attack or raid reached an enemy trench the grenadiers would be responsible for racing down the trench and throwing grenades into each dugout they passed: this invariably succeeded in purging dugouts of their human occupants in an attempt at surrender (often not accepted as they were promptly shot or stabbed).

Not that this was always the case during the war.  When Britain entered the war on 4 August it did so with just one type of grenade in its armoury (suitably named 'Mark 1'), and not very many of those.  As with the machine gun the British high command could not see much use for the hand grenade.

This situation soon changed however; indeed, within a year Britain was producing up to half a million hand grenades each week (with an average of 250,000).

Even so, British forces outside of the Western Front - which was given first call on grenade supplies - were lacking in supplies of grenades until well into 1916.

The French and Russian armies were rather better prepared than the British, since they fully expected to be in the position of besieging German fortresses: a task ideally suited to the grenade.

Two Forms of Detonation

Grenades - either hand or rifle driven - were detonated in one of two ways.  They were either detonated on impact (percussion) or via a timed fuse.

Generally speaking, infantrymen preferred timed fuses (of whatever amount of time) to percussion devices, since there remained the constant risk of accidentally jolting a grenade while in a trench and setting off an explosion.

The idea of using a pin, extracted by hand from a grenade, to set off a timed fuse quickly became commonplace and was a feature of most later grenades.  Another, earlier, method of igniting the fuse was via the so-called 'stick' grenade, where the fuse was lit when the grenade left the handle (stick) to which it was attached.

Yet another type, cylindrical and referred to as the 'cricket ball' grenade, was ignited by striking the grenade like a match before it was promptly despatched skywards.

Home-made Grenades

That first British grenade, the Mark 1 used in 1914, proved highly unpopular with soldiers.  Forming a canister with a 16-inch cane handle, it was ignited by removing a safety pin through the top.  When thrown, the handle (and attached linen streamers) ensured it landed nose down so that the striker was forced into the detonator.

However the Mark 1 caused widespread distrust given that it was liable to explode prematurely if it came into contact with an object while in the act of being thrown: again entirely feasible in a trench environment.

Consequently many British soldiers - and those based in Gallipoli who had no access to grenades of any type - resorted to the construction of home-made, or 'jam-tin' bombs.

So-named because they were literally made out of jam tins, each was packed with gun-cotton or dynamite, together with pieces of scrap metal.

A length of fuse would project through the top of the tin, with each inch of fuse giving approximately 1.25 seconds delay.  Other home-made grenades of differing designs were widespread and were seen in various fronts (including in Arabia and in Russia).

Grenade Development

However grenade development soon took off and, at least on the Western Front, ad-hoc types dwindled in numbers as better models appeared.

Rifle grenades were simply attached to a rod and placed down the barrel of a rifle, or instead placed in a cup attached to the barrel, and were launched by the blast of a blank cartridge.  Such grenades were never popular however, and were deemed (correctly) as inaccurate.  The Germans ceased using rifle grenades in 1916, although they continued to experiment with revised models.

The British and French however persisted with cup grenades.  The British, who had pioneered their use, together with the French improved the range of cup grenades from the average 180-200 metres to an impressive 400 metres (using fin grenades).

The Germans belatedly restarted using cup grenades in 1918.

The first truly popular British hand grenade - simply referred to as 'No. 15' - was churned out in huge numbers by the close of 1915, although its lack of performance in wet weather promptly led to a sharp downturn in its popularity.  Whereas up to half a million No, 15's were produced in the autumn of 1915, they were seldom used at all beyond the turn of the year.

The Mills Bomb

There were innumerable types of grenade designed and produced during the war - well over 50 - but one that endured, and which retains a popular awareness even today, is the Mills bomb, designed by William Mills in 1915.

Actually referred to officially as 'No. 5', the Mills bomb was introduced in May 1915 and became the dominant British grenade for the remainder of the war.  Weighing 1.25 lb, the Mills bomb's exterior was serrated so that when it detonated it broke into many fragments: thus, a fragmentation bomb.

To use the Mills bomb the thrower first removed the safety pin while holding down the strike lever beneath it.  When the grenade was actually thrown the strike lever ejected and a four-second fuse was set off.

British and Empire soldiers were instructed to lob the Mills bomb using a throwing action similar to bowling in cricket.  Classes were taught instructing soldiers how best to do this.

The Mills bomb was improved upon in 1917 with a revised model, No. 36M.  This was filled with explosive and then dipped in shellac, which served to seal the grenade and thus prevented rapid deterioration (markedly reducing the number of 'dud', i.e. ineffective, devices).  Its base plug was also strengthened, for use on a rifle discharger (when its fuse was lengthened to a seven-second delay).

Transported in boxes of twelve with detonators carried separately, British soldiers found that they could not readily carry multiple Mills bombs on their person on account of their closer fitting uniforms.  Their Australian allies, with looser clothing, could carry around half a dozen Mills bombs with reasonable comfort.  The British took to carrying green canvas buckets filled with Mills bombs (up to 24 at a time) for use in an attack.

The detonators were supposed to be attached to the actual grenade before the boxes of grenades reached the front line.  It was not unknown however for a box of Mills bombs to be opened for use only to discover that they were without their necessary detonators.

It has been estimated that during the course of the war approximately 70 million Mills bombs were thrown by the Allies, with perhaps 35 million other types; a testament to the overwhelming popularity of the Mills bomb itself.

German Models

The German army, having popularised use of the grenade at the start of the war, developed numerous models over the ensuing four years.

These included the Stielhandgranate (stick bomb), the Diskushandgranate (disc grenade), Eierhandgranate (hand grenade) and Kugelhandgranate (ball grenade, which included the grenade referred to by the British as the 'pineapple grenade').

With the Germans disliking impact (percussion) grenades as much as the Allies, all bar the disc grenade were activated by a time fuse.  Those grenades used by storm troopers utilised the shortest time fuse: a mere two seconds (so that their targets were given no time to seek shelter from the resultant explosion).

The Stielhandgranate - stick grenade - proved highly popular among German soldiers.  Some exploded on impact but most were set to detonate after either a 5.5 or 7 second delay.  German soldiers often carried such grenades in satchels thrown around their necks.

The Eierhandgranate - egg grenade - was also popular given its great throwing range, up to 50 yards.  The German army also made use of gas grenades, containing a poisonous liquid that discharged on impact.

Greatest Grenade Battle of the War

Undoubtedly the greatest grenade battle of the war occurred on the Pozieres Heights on the night of 26-27 July 1916.

Lasting for twelve-and-a-half hours without a break the Australians, with British support, exchanged grenades with their German foes (who threw multiple types of grenade: sticks, cricket balls, egg bombs and rifle grenades).  The allied contingent alone threw some 15,000 Mills bombs during the night.

Many grenadiers were killed that night, while many others simply fell down due to complete exhaustion.

World War One and Thereafter...

With the conclusion of World War One the grenade continued to hold its place firmly within the armoury of every nation's army.  During World War Two the US alone manufactured some 50 million fragmentation grenades.

Its development has continued to the present day.

In 1912 the British Army adopted the Vickers as its standard machine gun. Produced by the Vickers Company, it was a modified version of the Maxim Machine-Gun. The Vickers Gun used a 250 round fabric-belt magazine and had the reputation as a highly reliable weapon.

The .303 Vickers Gun could fire over 600 rounds per minute and had a range of 4,500 yards. Being water-cooled, it could fire continuously for long periods. There were usually six men in a Vickers gun team. In his book, With a Machine Gun to Cambrai, George Coppard, explained how the Vickers Gun Team worked. "Number One was leader and fired the gun, while Number Two controlled the entry of ammo belts into the feed-block. Number Three maintained a supply of ammo to Number Two, and Number Four to Six were reserves and carriers, but all the members of the team were fully trained in handling the gun."

When war was declared in August, 1914, Vickers were manufacturing 12 machine guns a week. Demand from the British Army was so high that Vickers had to find new ways of increasing production. By 1915 Vickers supplied the British armed forces with 2,405 guns. These increases continued throughout the First World War: 7,429 (1916); 21,782 (1917) and 39,473 (1918). The Vickers Company was accused of profiteering when in the early stages of the war they charged the Home Office £175 per gun. Under pressure from the government, Vickers reduced the price to £80 per gun.

Fitted with interrupter gear, the Vickers was also standard armament on all British and French aircraft after 1916.

Weapons of War: Flamethrowers
Updated - Monday, 7 January, 2002

The flamethrower, which brought terror to French and British soldiers when used by the German army in the early phases of the First World War in 1914 and 1915 (and which was quickly adopted by both) was by no means a particularly innovative weapon.

The basic idea of a flamethrower is to spread fire by launching burning fuel.  The earliest flamethrowers date as far back as the 5th century B.C.  These took the form of lengthy tubes filled with burning solids (such as coal or sulphur), and which were used in the same way as blow-guns: by blowing into one end of the tube the solid material inside would be propelled towards the operator's enemies.

The flamethrower was inevitably refined over the intervening centuries, although the models seen in the early days of World War One were developed at the turn of the 20th century.  The German army tested two models of flamethrower - or Flammenwerfer in German - in the early 1900s, one large and one small, both developed by Richard Fiedler.

The smaller, lighter Flammenwerfer (the Kleinflammenwerfer) was designed for portable use, carried by a single man.  Using pressurised air and carbon dioxide or nitrogen it belched forth a stream of burning oil for as much as 18 metres.

Fielder's second, larger model (the Grossflammenwerfer), worked along the same lines but was not suitable for transport by a single person, but whose maximum range was twice that of the smaller model; it could also sustain flames for a (then) impressive forty seconds, although it was decidedly expensive in its use of fuel.

Having tested the Flammenwerfer in 1900 the German army deployed it for use in three specialist battalions from 1911 onwards.

It was put to initial wartime use against the French in the south-eastern sector of the Western Front from October 1914, although its use was sporadic and went largely unreported.

The first notable use of the Flammenwerfer came in a surprise attack launched by the Germans upon the British at Hooge in Flanders.  Springing forward at 0315 on 30 July 1915 the Germans made effective use of the portable Flammenwerfer, with gas cylinders strapped to the back of the men responsible for using the instrument, a lit nozzle attached to each cylinder.

The effect of the dangerous nature of the surprise attack proved terrifying to the British opposition, although their line, initially pushed back, was stabilised later the same night. In two days of severe fighting the British lost 31 officers and 751 other ranks during the attack.

With the success of the Hooge attack, at least so far as the Flammenwerfer was concerned, the German army adopted the device on a widespread basis across all fronts of battle.  The Flammenwerfers tended to be used in groups of six during battle, each machine worked by two men.  They were used mostly to clear forward defenders during the start of a German attack, preceding their infantry colleagues.

They were undeniably useful when used at short-range, but were of limited wider effectiveness, especially once the British and French had overcome their initial alarm at their use.  The operators of Flammenwerfer equipment also lived a most dangerous existence.

Quite aside from the worries of handling the device - it was entirely feasible that the cylinder carrying the fuel might unexpectedly explode - they were marked men; the British and French poured rifle-fire into the area of attack where Flammenwerfers were used, and their operators could expect no mercy should they be taken prisoner.  Their life expectancy was therefore short.

The British, intrigued by the possibilities offered by flamethrowers, experimented with their own models.  In readiness for the Somme offensive they constructed four sizeable models (weighing two tons each), built directly into a forward trench constructed in No Man's Land a mere 60 yards from the German line.

Each was painstakingly constructed piece by piece, although two were destroyed by shellfire prior to 1 July 1916 (the start of the Somme offensive).  The remaining two, each with a range of 90 yards, were put to use as planned on 1 July.  Again highly effective at clearing trenches at a local level, they were of practically no wider benefit.  Their use was consequently abandoned.

Similarly the French developed their own portable one-man Schilt flamethrower, of a superior build to the German model.  It was used in trench attacks during 1917-18.  The Germans produced a lightweight modified version of their Flammenwerfer, the Wex, in 1917, which had the benefit of self-igniting.

During the war the Germans launched in excess of 650 flamethrower attacks; no numbers exist for British or French attacks.

By the close of the war flamethrower use had been extended to use on tanks, a policy carried forward to World War Two.  Flame-throwing equipment, albeit somewhat refined, continues in use to the present day.

Weapons of War: Flamethrowers
Updated - Monday, 7 January, 2002

The flamethrower, which brought terror to French and British soldiers when used by the German army in the early phases of the First World War in 1914 and 1915 (and which was quickly adopted by both) was by no means a particularly innovative weapon.

The basic idea of a flamethrower is to spread fire by launching burning fuel.  The earliest flamethrowers date as far back as the 5th century B.C.  These took the form of lengthy tubes filled with burning solids (such as coal or sulphur), and which were used in the same way as blow-guns: by blowing into one end of the tube the solid material inside would be propelled towards the operator's enemies.

The flamethrower was inevitably refined over the intervening centuries, although the models seen in the early days of World War One were developed at the turn of the 20th century.  The German army tested two models of flamethrower - or Flammenwerfer in German - in the early 1900s, one large and one small, both developed by Richard Fiedler.

The smaller, lighter Flammenwerfer (the Kleinflammenwerfer) was designed for portable use, carried by a single man.  Using pressurised air and carbon dioxide or nitrogen it belched forth a stream of burning oil for as much as 18 metres.

Fielder's second, larger model (the Grossflammenwerfer), worked along the same lines but was not suitable for transport by a single person, but whose maximum range was twice that of the smaller model; it could also sustain flames for a (then) impressive forty seconds, although it was decidedly expensive in its use of fuel.

Having tested the Flammenwerfer in 1900 the German army deployed it for use in three specialist battalions from 1911 onwards.

It was put to initial wartime use against the French in the south-eastern sector of the Western Front from October 1914, although its use was sporadic and went largely unreported.

The first notable use of the Flammenwerfer came in a surprise attack launched by the Germans upon the British at Hooge in Flanders.  Springing forward at 0315 on 30 July 1915 the Germans made effective use of the portable Flammenwerfer, with gas cylinders strapped to the back of the men responsible for using the instrument, a lit nozzle attached to each cylinder.

The effect of the dangerous nature of the surprise attack proved terrifying to the British opposition, although their line, initially pushed back, was stabilised later the same night. In two days of severe fighting the British lost 31 officers and 751 other ranks during the attack.

With the success of the Hooge attack, at least so far as the Flammenwerfer was concerned, the German army adopted the device on a widespread basis across all fronts of battle.  The Flammenwerfers tended to be used in groups of six during battle, each machine worked by two men.  They were used mostly to clear forward defenders during the start of a German attack, preceding their infantry colleagues.

They were undeniably useful when used at short-range, but were of limited wider effectiveness, especially once the British and French had overcome their initial alarm at their use.  The operators of Flammenwerfer equipment also lived a most dangerous existence.

Quite aside from the worries of handling the device - it was entirely feasible that the cylinder carrying the fuel might unexpectedly explode - they were marked men; the British and French poured rifle-fire into the area of attack where Flammenwerfers were used, and their operators could expect no mercy should they be taken prisoner.  Their life expectancy was therefore short.

The British, intrigued by the possibilities offered by flamethrowers, experimented with their own models.  In readiness for the Somme offensive they constructed four sizeable models (weighing two tons each), built directly into a forward trench constructed in No Man's Land a mere 60 yards from the German line.

Each was painstakingly constructed piece by piece, although two were destroyed by shellfire prior to 1 July 1916 (the start of the Somme offensive).  The remaining two, each with a range of 90 yards, were put to use as planned on 1 July.  Again highly effective at clearing trenches at a local level, they were of practically no wider benefit.  Their use was consequently abandoned.

Similarly the French developed their own portable one-man Schilt flamethrower, of a superior build to the German model.  It was used in trench attacks during 1917-18.  The Germans produced a lightweight modified version of their Flammenwerfer, the Wex, in 1917, which had the benefit of self-igniting.

During the war the Germans launched in excess of 650 flamethrower attacks; no numbers exist for British or French attacks.

By the close of the war flamethrower use had been extended to use on tanks, a policy carried forward to World War Two.  Flame-throwing equipment, albeit somewhat refined, continues in use to the present day.

Weapons of War: Poison Gas
Updated - Sunday, 5 May, 2002

Considered uncivilised prior to World War One, the development and use of poison gas was necessitated by the requirement of wartime armies to find new ways of overcoming the stalemate of unexpected trench warfare.

First Use by the French

Although it is popularly believed that the German army was the first to use gas it was in fact initially deployed by the French.  In the first month of the war, August 1914, they fired tear-gas grenades (xylyl bromide) against the Germans.  Nevertheless the German army was the first to give serious study to the development of chemical weapons and the first to use it on a large scale.

Initial German Experiments

In the capture of Neuve Chapelle in October 1914 the German army fired shells at the French which contained a chemical irritant whose result was to induce a violent fit of sneezing.  Three months later, on 31 January 1915, tear gas was employed by the Germans for the first time on the Eastern Front.

Fired in liquid form contained in 15 cm howitzer shells against the Russians at Bolimov, the new experiment proved unsuccessful, with the tear gas liquid failing to vaporise in the freezing temperatures prevalent at Bolimov.

Not giving up, the Germans tried again with an improved tear gas concoction at Nieuport against the French in March 1915.

Introduction of Poison Gas

The debut of the first poison gas however - in this instance, chlorine - came on 22 April 1915, at the start of the Second Battle of Ypres.

At this stage of the war the famed Ypres Salient, held by the British, Canadians and French, ran for some 10 miles and bulged into German occupied territory for five miles.  A combination of French territorials and Algerian troops held the line to the left, with the British and Canadians tending the centre and line to their right.

During the morning of 22 April the Germans poured a heavy bombardment around Ypres, but the line fell silent as the afternoon grew.  Towards evening, at around 5 pm, the bombardment began afresh - except that sentries posted among the French and Algerian troops noticed a curious yellow-green cloud drifting slowly towards their line.

Puzzled but suspicious the French suspected that the cloud masked an advance by German infantry and ordered their men to 'stand to' - that is, to mount the trench fire step in readiness for probable attack.

The cloud did not mask an infantry attack however; at least, not yet.  It signalled in fact the first use of chlorine gas on the battlefield.  Ironically its use ought not to have been a surprise to the Allied troops, for captured German soldiers had revealed the imminent use of gas on the Western Front.  Their warnings were not passed on however.

The effects of chlorine gas were severe.  Within seconds of inhaling its vapour it destroyed the victim's respiratory organs, bringing on choking attacks.  (For a memoir of the first gas attack click here.)

A Missed German Opportunity

Panic-stricken the French and Algerian troops fled in disorder, creating a four-mile gap in the Allied line.  Had the Germans been prepared for this eventuality they could potentially have effected a decisive breakthrough.  However the results of their experiment caused as much surprise to the German high command as confusion among their opponents.

German infantry did advance into the gap, but nervously and with hesitance.  Outflanking the Canadian and British troops to their right, the ensuing fighting was difficult.  Although the Germans succeeded in seizing control of a significant portion of the salient the Allies nevertheless managed to re-form a continuous line, though in parts it remained dangerously weak.

Condemnation - and Escalation

The Germans' use of chlorine gas provoked immediate widespread condemnation, and certainly damaged German relations with the neutral powers, including the U.S.  The gas attacks were placed to rapid propaganda use by the British although they planned to respond in kind.

The attack had one clear benefit at home however, for it brought to an end German hesitancy (and disagreement) over its use.  The cat was out of the bag; and the use of poison gas continued to escalate for the remainder of the war.

Allied Retaliation

Once the Allies had recovered from the initial shock of the Germans' practical application of poison gas warfare, a determination existed to exact retaliatory revenge at the earliest opportunity.  The British were the first to respond.

Raising Special Gas Companies in the wake of the Germans' April attack (of approximately 1,400 men) operating under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Foulkes, instructions were given to prepare for a gas attack at Loos in September 1915.

Interestingly the men who comprised the British Special Gas Companies were not allowed to refer to the word "gas" in their operations, such was the stigma attached to its use.  Instead they referred to their gas canisters as "accessories"; use of the word "gas" brought with it a threatened punishment.

On the evening of 24 September 1915, therefore, some 400 chlorine gas emplacements were established among the British front line around Loos.  The gas was released by turning a cock on each cylinder.

British Setback at Loos

The retaliatory attack began the following morning at 5.20 am.  A mixture of smoke and chlorine gas was released intermittently over a period of about 40 minutes before the infantry assault began.

However, releasing gas from cylinders in this manner meant that the user had to be wary of wind conditions.  It was desirable that a light wind exist in the direction of the enemy trenches; if the wind were to turn however, the biter would be bit.

In parts of the British line that morning this is precisely what transpired.

The wind shifted and quantities of the smoke and gas were blown back into the British trenches.  It has been estimated that more British gas casualties were suffered that morning than German.

Although the numbers are arguable there is little doubt but that the exercise proved a failure: and the resultant infantry attack similarly failed.

The Need for a New Delivery Mechanism

Although it was the British who chiefly suffered on 25 September 1915 all three chief armies - Britain, France and Germany - suffered similar self-inflicted gas reversals during 1915.  It became apparent that if gas was to be used a more reliable delivery mechanism was called for.

In consequence experiments were undertaken to deliver the gas payload in artillery shells.  This provided the additional benefits of increasing the target range as well as the variety of gases released.

Phosgene

Following on the heels of chlorine gas came the use of phosgene.  Phosgene as a weapon was more potent than chlorine in that while the latter was potentially deadly it caused the victim to violently cough and choke.

Phosgene caused much less coughing with the result that more of it was inhaled; it was consequently adopted by both German and Allied armies.  Phosgene often had a delayed effect; apparently healthy soldiers were taken down with phosgene gas poisoning up to 48 hours after inhalation.

The so-called "white star" mixture of phosgene and chlorine was commonly used on the Somme: the chlorine content supplied the necessary vapour with which to carry the phosgene.

Mustard Gas

Remaining consistently ahead in terms of gas warfare development, Germany unveiled an enhanced form of gas weaponry against the Russians at Riga in September 1917: mustard gas (or Yperite) contained in artillery shells.

Mustard gas, an almost odourless chemical, was distinguished by the serious blisters it caused both internally and externally, brought on several hours after exposure.  Protection against mustard gas proved more difficult than against either chlorine or phosgene gas.

The use of mustard gas - sometimes referred to as Yperite - also proved to have mixed benefits.  While inflicting serious injury upon the enemy the chemical remained potent in soil for weeks after release: making capture of infected trenches a dangerous undertaking.

Ever Increasing Production

As with chlorine and phosgene gas before it, the Allies promptly reciprocated by copying the Germans' use of mustard gas.  By 1918 the use of use of poison gases had become widespread, particularly on the Western Front.  If the war had continued into 1919 both sides had planned on inserting poison gases into 30%-50% of manufactured shells.

Other types of gases produced by the belligerents included bromine and chloropicrin.  The French army occasionally made use of a nerve gas obtained from prussic acid.

However three forms of gas remained the most widely used: chlorine, phosgene and mustard.

The German army ended the war as the heaviest user of gas.  It is suggested that German use reached 68,000 tons; the French utilised 36,000 tons and the British 25,000.

Diminishing Effectiveness of Gas

Although gas claimed a notable number of casualties during its early use, once the crucial element of surprise had been lost the overall number of casualties quickly diminished.  Indeed, deaths from gas after about May 1915 were relatively rare.

It has been estimated that among British forces the number of gas casualties from May 1915 amounted to some 9 per cent of the total - but that of this total only around 3% were fatal.  Even so, gas victims often led highly debilitating lives thereafter with many unable to seek employment once they were discharged from the army.

In large part this was because of the increasing effectiveness of the methods used to protect against poison gas.  Gas never turned out to be the weapon that turned the tide of the war, as was often predicted.  Innovations in its use were quickly combated and copied by opposing armies in an ongoing cycle.

Protection Against Gas

The types of protection initially handed out to the troops around Ypres following the first use of chlorine in April 1915 were primitive in the extreme.  100,000 wads of cotton pads were quickly manufactured and made available.  These were dipped in a solution of bicarbonate of soda and held over the face.

Soldiers were also advised that holding a urine drenched cloth over their face would serve in an emergency to protect against the effects of chlorine.

By 1918 soldiers on both sides were far better prepared to meet the ever-present threat of a gas attack.  Filter respirators (using charcoal or antidote chemicals) were the norm and proved highly effective, although working in a trench while wearing such respirators generally proved difficult and tiring.

With the Armistice, such was the horror and disgust at the wartime use of poison gases that its use was outlawed in 1925 - a ban that is, at least nominally, still in force today.

Casualties From Gas - The Numbers

Country	Total Casualties	Death
Austria-Hungary	100,000	3,000
British Empire	188,706	8,109
France	190,000	8,000
Germany	200,000	9,000
Italy	60,000	4,627
Russia	419,340	56,000
USA	72,807	1,462
Others	10,000	1,000

Photographs courtesy of Photos of the Great War website

The human tragedy of the Great War of 1914-18 is beyond comprehension. Great Britain and her Empire lost over 1,000,000 combatants; France, 1,300,000; Russia, 1,700,000; Germany and its allies, 3,500,000. Losses in life per day of the war exceeded 5,500.

One cause of this immense loss of life is that the countries involved didn't realise the destructive power of the weapons developed since the last European war almost 50 years earlier.

By 1915 the bolt action .303 Lee Enfield Rifle with a range of nearly a mile could fire 25 rounds a minute. Even more devastating was the Vickers Machine Gun which fired 600 rounds a minute. The howitzer could fire shells eight miles. Add Grenades, flame throwers and (eventually) gas and it is no surprise that by the end of 1914 both sides had dug into the earth like moles in a desperate attempt to stay alive.

The resulting trench system on the Western Front not only covered the equivalent of 25,000 miles (enough to encircle the world) but also stretched non-stop from Belgium to Switzerland.

 

These pages help you to learn more about life in the trenches. Click on the options to the left to work through the site.

… Front Line: Took the main force of enemy attacks

… Reserve Line: If the Front Line looked like being overwhelmed, then the troops in the reserve trench could be used to support them

… Support Line: Mainly used to rest troops although could be called upon to help in a crisis.

… Sap / Fire trenches ñ went into no-man's land. Very dangerous.

… All the trenches were linked by communications trenches.

Each trench ñ 10 feet deep; half way up was a ledge called the fire step where people would shoot from. They would look over the top with a periscope normally. They would sleep in holes dug into the sides of the trench called dugouts. Front line trenches were separated by an area called no-manís land which could vary in width from a few hundred yards to a mile. Each side protected their trenches with masses of barbed wire. Behind the trenches were the heavy guns of the artillery, designed to obliterate the enemy before an attack. They usually failed.

No Man's Land is the term used by soldiers to describe the ground between the two opposing trenches. Its width along the Western Front could vary a great deal. The average distance in most sectors was about 250 yards (230 metres). However, at Guillemont it was only 50 yards (46 metres) whereas at Cambrai it was over 500 yards (460 metres). The narrowest gap was at Zonnebeke where British and German soldiers were only about seven yards apart.

No Man's Land contained a considerable amount of barbed wire. In the areas most likely to be attacked, there were ten belts of barbed wire just before the front-line trenches. In some places the wire was more than a 100 feet (30 metres) deep.

If the area had seen a lot of action No Man's Land would be full of broken and abandoned military equipment. After an attack No Man's Land would also contain a large number of bodies. Advances across No Man's Land was always very difficult. Not only did the soldiers have to avoid being shot or blown-up, they also had to cope with barbed-wire and water-filled, shell-holes.

Soldiers were only occasionally involved in a full-scale attack across No Man's Land. However, men were sometimes ordered into No Man's Land to obtain information about the enemy. When a artillery shell had landed just in front of an enemy trench, soldiers were often ordered to take control of the shell-hole and to try and spy on the enemy.

Small patrols were also sent out to obtain information about the enemy. These patrols would go out at night. They would have to crawl forward on their stomachs in an attempt to get close enough to find out what the enemy was up to. If possible, they would try and capture a sentry and bring him back for interrogation. To stop British night patrols the Germans used a light-shell rocket. Suspended from a small parachute, the flare blazed brightly for a minute giving the defending troops a chance to kill the soldiers who had advanced into No Man's Land.

C. R. W. Nevinson, Paths of Glory (1917)

 

 

 

 

(1) In a letter to his parents, Second Lieutenant H. E. Cooper explained what it was like to go on a patrol into No Man's Land.

I was asked to take out a patrol of seven men: duties - get out to the position of the German listening post, wait for their patrol and 'scupper' it; also discover what work is being done in their trenches. I choose my favourite corporal and my six most intelligent and courageous men. Bayonets are examined to see if they slip out of the scabbard noiselessly; my revolver is nicely oiled; all spare and superfluous parts of equipment is left behind.

As soon as the dusk is sufficiently dark, we get out into the front of the trenches by climbing up on to the parapet and tumbling over as rapidly as possible so as not to be silhouetted against the last traces of the sunset. Every man knows that he has probably seen his last sunset, for this is the most dangerous thing in war. Out we walk through the barbed wire entanglement zone through which an approaching enemy must climb, but we have a zigzag path through the thirty yards or so of prickly unpleasantness; this path is only known to a few. The night has become horribly dark already, and the stillness of the night is broken only by the croaking of many frogs, the hoot of an owl and the boom of distant guns in the south.

We all advance slowly and carefully, wriggling along through the grass for a hundred yards or so, past the two lines of willow trees and across the stream, now practically dry. There we lie and wait and listen. For an hour we lie in absolute silence. It is a weary game and extremely trying to one's nerves, for hearing and sight are strained to the utmost. Tiny noises are magnified a hundredfold - a rat nibbling at the growing corn or a rabbit scuttling along gives us all the jumps until we learn to differentiate the different sounds. In the German trenches we hear the faint hum of conversation. Nothing is to be heard near us, but there is a very ominous sign - no shots are being fired from the trenches in front of us, no flares are being sent up and there is no working party out. This points to only one thing and that is that they also have a patrol out.

Suddenly quite close to the corporal and myself there is a heavy rustling in the grass on the right. Now, if never before, I know the meaning of - is it fear? My heart thumps so heavily that they surely must hear it, my face is covered with a cold perspiration, my revolver hammer goes back with a sharp click and my hand trembles.

 

(2) Siegfried Sassoon described in his diary details of a patrol into No Man's Land that took place on 25th May 1916.

Twenty-seven men with faces blackened and shiny - with hatchets in their belts, bombs in pockets, knobkerries - waiting in a dug-out in the reserve line. At 10.30 they trudge up to Battalion H.Q. splashing through the mire and water in a chalk trench, while the rain comes steadily down. Then up to the front-line. In a few minutes they have gone over and disappeared into the rain and darkness.

I am sitting on the parapet listening for something to happen - five, ten, nearly fifteen minutes - not a sound - nor a shot fired - and only the usual flare-lights. Then one of the men comes crawling back; I follow him to our trench and he tells me that they can't get through. They are all going to throw a bomb and retire.

A minute or two later a rifle-shot rings out and almost simultaneously several bombs are thrown by both sides; there are blinding flashes and explosions, rifle-shots, the scurry of feet, curses and groans, and stumbling figures loom up and scramble over the parapet - some wounded. When I've counted sixteen in, I go forward to see how things are going. Other wounded men crawl in; I find one hit in the leg; he says O'Brien is somewhere down the crater badly wounded. They are still throwing bombs and firing at us: the sinister sound of clicking bolts seem to be very near; perhaps they have crawled out of their trench and are firing from behind the advanced wire.

At last I find O'Brien down a deep (about twenty-five feet) and precipitous crater. He is moaning and his right arm is either broken or almost shot off: he is also hit in the right leg. Another man is with him; he is hit in the right arm. I leave them there and get back to the trench for help, shortly afterwards Lance-Corporal Stubbs is brought in (he has had his foot blown off). I get a rope and two more men and go back to O'Brien, who is unconscious now. With great difficulty we get him half-way up the face of the crater; it is now after one o'clock and the sky is beginning to get lighter. I make one more journey to our trench for another strong man and to see to a stretcher being ready. We get him in, and it is found that he has died, as I had feared.

 

(3) Ernst Toller, I Was a German (1933)

One night we heard a cry, the cry of one in excruciating pain; then all was quiet again. Someone in his death agony, we thought. But an hour later the cry came again. It never ceased the whole night. Nor the following night. Naked and inarticulate the cry persisted. We could not tell whether it came from the throat of German or Frenchman. It existed in its own right, an agonized indictment of heaven and earth. We thrust our fingers into our ears to stop its moan; but it was no good; the cry cut like a drill into our heads, dragging minutes into hours, hours into years. We withered and grew old between those cries.

Later we learned that it was one of our own men hanging on the wire. Nobody could do anything for him; two men had already tried to save him, only to be shot themselves. We prayed desperately for his death. He took so long about it, and if he went on much longer we should go mad. But on the third day his cries were stopped by death.

 

(4) Captain Geoffrey Donaldson, letter to his mother (23rd June, 1916)

The night before last I took out a patrol of four men about half way across No Man's Land. There is comparatively little risk attached to this work but it is of course a considerable strain on the nerves. Last night, I went out with Wakefield and a wiring party, that is to say with about six men improving our wire entanglements. I consider on the the whole this is a nerve-racking a job as any, more so than patrol work. You must not think I shall go out like this every night. I have been out the last two nights as much to set an example and get the thing going as anything.

 

(5) Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That (1929)

Dunn showed me around the line. The battalion frontage was about eight hundred yards. Each company held some two hundred of these, with two platoons in the front line, and two in the support line about a hundred yards back. He introduced me to the platoon sergeants, more particularly to Sergeant Eastmond and told him to give me any information I wanted; then went back to sleep, asking to be woken at once if anything went wrong. I found myself in charge of the line. Sergeant Eastmond being busy with a working-party.

I went round by myself. The men of the working-party, whose job was to replace the traverses, or safety-buttresses, of the trench, looked curiously at me. They were filling sandbags with earth, piling them up bricklayer fashion, the headers and stretchers alternating, then patting them flat with spades. The sentries stood on the fire-step at the comers of the traverses, stamping their feet and blowing on their fingers. Every now and then they peered over the top for a few seconds. Two parties, each of an N.C.O. and two men, were out in the company listening-posts, connected with the front trench by a sap about fifty yards long. The German front line stretched some three hundred yards beyond. From berths hollowed in the sides of the trench and curtained with sandbags came the grunt of sleeping me.

I jumped up on the fire-step beside the sentry and cautiously raised my head, staring over the parapet. I could see nothing except the wooden pickets supporting our protecting barbed-wire entanglements, and a dark patch or two of bushes beyond. The darkness seemed to move and shake about as I looked at it; the bushes started travelling, singly at first, then both together. The pickets did the same. I was glad of the sentry beside me; he gave his name as Beaumont. 'They're quiet tonight, sir,' he said.

I said: It's funny how those bushes seem to move.'

'Aye, they do play queer tricks. Is this your first spell in trenches?"

A German flare shot up, broke into bright flame, dropped slowly and went hissing into the grass just behind our trench, showing up the bushes and pickets. Instinctively I moved.

'It's bad to do that, sir,' he said, as a rifle-bullet cracked and seemed to pass right between us. 'Keep still, sir, and they can't spot you. Not but what a flare is a bad thing to fall on you. I've seen them burn a hole in a man.'

 

(6) John Raws, letter to a friend (4th August 1916)

We do all our fighting and moving at night and the confusion of passing through a barrage of enemy shells is pretty appalling. You've read of the wrecked villages? Well, some of these about here are not wrecked. They are utterly destroyed, so that there are not even skeletons of building left - nothing but a churned mass of debris, with bricks, stones and girders and bodies pounded to nothing. And forests! There are not even tree trunks left - not a leaf or a twig. All is buried and churned up again and buried again. The sad part is that one can see no end of this. If we live tonight we have to go through tomorrow night - and next week - and next month.

 

No Man's Land at Passchendaele in 1917

So that soldiers in front-line trenches could fire through the parapet, a fire-step was dug into the forward side of the trench. The fire-step was 2 or 3 ft high. It was on this that the sentries stood. It was also used by the whole unit when standing-to (an anticipated enemy attack).

 

Cross-section of a front-line trench